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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Firm acquisition has become an increasingly important phenomenon in many industrial
countries in the last one or two decades. Following acquisition two diﬀerent outcomes may
be observed: either the acquirer keeps both ﬁrms operating and both brands, or merges
them and only one brand appears thereafter before consumers. Most bank acquisitions are
examples of the former strategy, which I call a concentration movement; Pinkse and Slade
(2002) refer to the UK brewing industry, in which acquisitions have reduced the number of
ﬁrms from six to four, although keeping the number of brands fairly constant. In turn, the
suppression of a brand (e.g. the recent decision of DaimlerChrysler to end the Plymouth
brand) is part of the latter strategy. Motivation and welfare eﬀects are not invariant, and
hence an analysis on these issues is relevant. This is exactly the aim of this paper: to ﬁnd
out causes and welfare consequences of each option, and to compare them.
I consider an industry with product diﬀerentiation, where brand names play a role in the
level of demand. I perform the analysis both for price and for quantity as strategic variables.
Following a concentration movement both brands subsist and the new owner maximizes a
proﬁt function corresponding to the sum of the proﬁts before acquisition. If the ﬁrms merge,
one of the brands is suppressed - the new common name has a value somewhere in between
the two pre-merger values; optimization is performed for the sum of proﬁts with this new
brand equity. Each option has diﬀerent consequences upon rivals’ behavior and payoﬀs, and
upon the surplus of consumers, which is also studied.
This paper is related with the literature on mergers with product diﬀerentiation, with the
literature on brand names (e.g. Wiggins and Raboy, 1996; Tadelis, 1999), and with the lit-
erature on the welfare eﬀects of variety (e.g. Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Mankiw
and Whinston, 1986; Klemperer and Padilla, 1997). Product diﬀerentiation reverses the pri-
vate unproﬁtability result of horizontal agreements under Cournot competition (Salant et
al, 1983; Granero, 1997) and thus makes it more attractive to join. Under price competition
horizontal agreements are always proﬁtable in a diﬀerentiated product market (Deneckere
and Davidson, 1985). In this paper brand names work as an instrument of diﬀerentiation.1
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 3
presents the results for two competing ﬁrms. Section 4 introduces post-acquisition rivalry
and distinguishes between price and quantity competition. Section 5 concludes.
1The value of a brand to a ﬁrm, called brand equity, includes customer loyalty toward the brand, the
brand’s name awareness, perceived quality, and brand associations.
22M o d e l
Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), I consider the following inverse demand
structure:
pi = αi − βqi − γ
X
j6=i
qj i =1 ,...n, with αi,β ,γ> 0 (1)
In this general formulation there are n brands, each produced by a diﬀerent ﬁrm. They
are substitutes (γ>0). Diﬀerent intercepts capture diﬀerent brand values: the higher
the value of the brand, the more consumers are willing to pay (because they obtain more
utility), so the higher αi.2 This is an absolute demand advantage for ﬁrm i.G o o d sa r et h u s
diﬀerentiated both through their technical characteristics (γ 6= β) and through their names
(α1 6= α2).3
To begin with, I consider the two-brand case. Since this case, although simple to deal
with, does not capture rivalry nor diﬀerentiation after acquisition (because the industry
becomes a “monopoly”), I then generalize by admitting a third party, that stays out of the
acquisition process. Still, the two-brand case does not allow a separate analysis of the eﬀects
upon consumers buying from the joining ﬁrms and upon those buying from outside ﬁrms
(which are already captured in a three-brand environment), neither to distinguish between
price and quantity competition after acquisition. However, it provides conclusions that are
robust to more players.
3T w o c o m p e t i n g b r a n d s
Consider an industry with two ﬁrms, each producing its own brand, with inverse demands
given by
p1 = α1 − βq1 − γq2
p2 = α2 − βq2 − γq1 with α1, α2, β, γ > 0, β
2 >γ 2 (2)
When α1 = α2 and β = γ these goods are perfect substitutes. The assumption of
β
2 >γ 2,e q u i v a l e n tt oβ>γgiven that γ>0, implies that the own eﬀect of quantity on
price is larger than the cross eﬀect. Without loss of generality, assume that α1 >α 2 (brand
2Note that the exogenous demand parameter may include more than just brand value (willingness to pay
connected with other factors), but for simplicity we normalize these factors to zero.
3A sD i x i t( 1 9 7 9 )s t a t e sa f t e rp r o v i n gt h ed i ﬀerent impacts of the two types of diﬀerentiation, "industrial
organization economists should keep these two aspects distinct".
31’s value is higher than 2’s).4




2 − γ2 −
β
β
2 − γ2pi +
γ
β
2 − γ2pj i =1 ,2 (3)
If ﬁrms compete in prices, then, assuming zero production costs,5 they choose pi (i =1 ,2)
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Notice that p1 and p2 are strategic complements (Bulow et al, 1985) if and only if γ>0.
Actually, when p1 increases demand directed to ﬁrm 2 rises if 1 and 2 are substitutes, so p2
increases as well.
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So, social welfare can be written as












4This linear structure obtains from a quadratic and strictly concave utility function U(q1,q 2)=const +




2 . Strict concavity requires β>0 and β2 >γ 2.
5Production costs are irrelevant in this analysis, as they do no change with the type of operation. The
only situation in which they might appear, as ﬁxed cost, is when one of the brands is suppressed and the
ﬁrm needs to signal consumers, through a marketing campaign, that the surviving one has absorbed it, thus
directing potential clients.
4If ﬁrms compete in quantities, and again assuming zero production costs, qi is chosen to
maximize
πi =( αi − βqi − γqj)qi (5)
Quantities are strategic substitutes for γ>0.
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Notice that the more asymmetric α1 and α2 are (higher α1 and lower α2) the less clear
it is that a rise in γ implies a decline in proﬁts, as happens when product diﬀerentiation
derives only from diﬀerent own and cross-price eﬀects (α1 = α2). This observation reinforces
the importance of considering both types of diﬀerentiation.
3.1 Concentration
Results after acquisition are invariant to the strategic variable (because the industry becomes
monopolized). If these ﬁrms concentrate, without merging, the new entity chooses p1 and
p2 in order to maximize
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or q1 and q2 to maximize
π1 + π2 =( α1 − βq1 − γq2)q1 +( α2 − βq2 − γq1)q2 (6.B)
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3.2 Merging
If ﬁrms merge there will be a single brand, with value α ∈ [α2,α 1]. I assume that the new
brand’s value may not be lower than the lowest pre-acquisition, nor rise above the highest
pre-acquisition. If α = α1+α2
2 (a particular case), consumers value the new brand exactly as
the average of the pre-acquisition values.
There are still two demand curves, both with the same intercept: pi = α − βqi − γqj
(i =1 ,2). The new entity maximizes (in price or quantity) the sum of proﬁts in markets 1
































4(β + γ)2 (7.7)
63.3 Merge or concentrate?
B a s e do np r e v i o u sl i t e r a t u r er e s u l t s ,Iomit the discussion on the incentives for ﬁrms pro-
ducing imperfectly substitute goods to join, either with price or quantity as actions, and go
directly to the analysis of the preferred type of agreement.
In order to analyze ﬁrms’ motivation, that is, their preference for concentration or merger,
let us compare proﬁts in both situations.
PSac − PS am =
(α2
1 + α2




In turn, in order to analyze consumers’ preferences for one option or the other, let us look
at
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8(β − γ)2(β + γ)2 (8.2)
Finally, in order to consider the regulatory authority’s problem we look at SWac − SWam.
Note that the expressions above are concave and always decreasing in α,a n dt h a tf o r
α = α1+α2
2 (that is, when the new brand value equals the average of the pre-acquisition
brand values) ﬁrms and consumers both prefer concentration to merger, contradicting the
intuition according to which one would expect them to be indiﬀerent. Indiﬀerence values
are actually higher than α1+α2
2 and are not the same for consumers and ﬁrms. Indeed,
PSac − PSam =
(α1−α2)2
8(β−γ) > 0 and CSac − CSam =
β(α1−α2)2
16(β−γ)2 > 0 for α = α1+α2
2 .T h eﬁrst
roots are lower than α2. Hence, for more than half the allowed range of α (the lower half)
ﬁrms and consumers have the same preferences as to the type of agreement, and therefore
the regulatory authority has no need to care about the ﬁrms’ decision when there are no
rivals. Since the new brand would have a "low" value, ﬁrms prefer to keep both brands, and
that is also in the consumers’ interest.
Consider now the transformation α = α1+α2
2 + ∆,w i t hα2−α1
2 ≤ ∆ ≤ α1−α2
2 . ∆ > 0
(∆ < 0) means that reputation is improved (harmed) with merger as compared with the
average reputation before acquisition. Then
PSac − PSam =




CSac − CSam =
β((α1 − α2)2(β + γ)2 − 4(β − γ)2((α1 + α2)∆ + ∆2))
16(β − γ)2(β + γ)2 (9.2)
SWac − SWam =
(α1 − α2)2(3β − 2γ)(β + γ)2 − 4(3β +2 γ)(β − γ)2((α1 + α2)2∆ + ∆2)
16(β − γ)2(β + γ)2
(9.3)
7These expressions are concave in ∆. We restrict attention to ∆ > 0 (since it has been shown
that PSac >P S am and CSac >C S am for all ∆ ≤ 0). Depending on the values of the
parameters, we may have one of the situations depicted in the ﬁgures below.
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Figure 1: β + γ>α1
α2 + α2
α1
No relationship can be established between α1−α2
2 , the upper bound of ∆, and the highest
roots of PS ac −PS am (∆PS
2 )a n dCSac −CSam (∆CS
2 ). Hence, there are three possibilities




2 ), depending on the values of the parameters.6
Note that ∆PS
2 > ∆CS
2 if and only if β + γ>α1
α2 + α2
α1.
The meaning of the depicted areas is the following:
Area A: ﬁrms and consumers both prefer concentration
Area B: ﬁrms and consumers both prefer merger
Area C: ﬁrms prefer concentration, consumers prefer merger
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be true or not.
8Figure 2.i) 
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Figure 2: β + γ<α1
α2 + α2
α1
Therefore, there may actually exist some divergence between ﬁrms’ and consumers’ in-
terests, which gives room for policy intervention. This corresponds to areas C and D (ﬁgures
1i and ii and 2i and ii). If it exists, this divergence area may be larger (ﬁgures 1ii and 2ii)
or smaller (ﬁgures 1i and 2i).
The more close brands 1 and 2 are in terms of reputation, and the more important are
direct and cross price eﬀects (higher β and γ), the more likely that the divergence will be
of type C, that is, with ﬁrms preferring concentration, but consumers being better oﬀ if
they would merge instead. This is intuitive, given that brands are substitutes. On the
contrary, the more asymmetric are brands’ reputations (higher α1 and lower α2), and the
less important are price eﬀects (lower β and γ), the more likely that the divergence is of type
D, with ﬁrms choosing to merge, but consumers preferring them to maintain both brands.7
8
7These results are in general consistent with the acquisitions observed in the Portuguese banking system.
Note that when γ is high ﬁrms 1 and 2 are operating in the same market (for example, retail), since their
products are close substitutes to each other. On the contrary, when γ is low (in the limit, zero) markets 1
and 2 are independent (for example, retail and investment).
8It can also be seen that as asymmetry (α1 − α2)i n c r e a s e st h ei n t e r v a li nw h i c hﬁrms prefer to merge
enlarges, but its relative size to the whole allowed range of ∆ declines.
9So, as α rises ﬁrms are the ﬁrst to prefer merger when brand values diﬀer much, and
consumers are the ﬁrst when they are similar. Only for very high α is it possible that both
groups prefer merger.9
Proposition 1 The type of agreement -concentration or merger- is not irrelevant in terms
of social welfare. There is room for policy intervention when joining ﬁrms’ interests and
consumers’ interests diﬀer, which may happen for some non-empty range of α,t h ev a l u eo f
the new common brand. When joining brands have quite diﬀerent reputations, there may
exist a non-empty interval for α where ﬁrms choose to merge but consumers would prefer
both brands to be maintained. The reverse is true when pre-acquisition brands are similar
in terms of value. Price eﬀects matter, too: when they are small (large) there may exit a
non-empty range of α where consumers prefer ﬁrms to concentrate (merge), but these are
more likely to choose merger (concentration).
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α1α2 rises with β, γ and
α2, and declines with α1.
Looking at producer plus consumer surpluses (the problem of the authority), two situ-
ations may occur, depending on the parameter values: either concentration is better than
merger for all ∆,o ro n l yu pt o∆SW
2 , the higher root of SWac −SWam.I ti st h u sc l e a rt h a t
the two types of acquisition are not indiﬀerent as to their social eﬀects.
Total quantity placed in the market with merger is higher than with concentration if
and only if the new brand value rises above the average of α1 and α2.10 The ﬁrm with
the highest brand value, α1, is more likely to prefer concentration than the ﬁrm with α2.
Consumers of ﬁrm 1 are also more likely to prefer concentration than consumers of 2.
4 Rivalry after acquisition
The above analysis is enriched, and still feasible, if the initial number of ﬁr m si sr a i s e dt o
three. Then there is still rivalry after acquisition, and we can isolate the impact on outside
9If one admits that merging requires a strictly positive advertising investment, in order to direct consumers
of the old brand to the surviving one, which concentration does not require, then preference for merger
becomes less likely.
10Note that, although I am using the terminology "new brand", this may actually be one of the old brands
(the surviving one). It need not be a newly created one.
10ﬁrms, as well as the diﬀerentiated impact on consumers buying from inside and from outside
the agreement. In this subsection I only present the results that are new relative to the
two-brand case.
4.1 Price competition
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(10.2)
If two of these ﬁrms concentrate, say for instance ﬁrms 1 and 2, the choice of p1 and p2
is performed in order to maximize
π1 + π2 =
µ
α1(β + γ) − (α2 + α3)γ
(β − γ)(β +2 γ)
−
β + γ
(β − γ)(β +2 γ)
p1 +
γ
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γ




while ﬁrm 3 chooses p3 that maximizes
π3 =
µ
α3(β + γ) − (α1 + α2)γ
(β − γ)(β +2 γ)
−
β + γ
(β − γ)(β +2 γ)
p3 +
γ
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(11.2.B)
If ﬁrms 1 and 2 merge, the new owner maximizes the sum of proﬁts arising from demand
curves p1 = α − βq1 − γ(q2 + q3) and p2 = α − βq2 − γ(q1 + q3) with α ∈ [α2,α 1].F o rﬁrm
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4.2 Quantity competition
For a three-brand industry with Cournot competition the Nash equilibrium before acquisi-
tion is given by (i =1 ,2,3)
q∗
i =
αi(2β + γ) − (αj + αk)γ




β(αi(2β + γ) − (αj + αk)γ)
2(2β − γ)(β + γ)
(13.2)
If ﬁrms 1 and 2 concentrate q1 and q2 are chosen to maximize
π1 + π2 =( α1 − βq1 − γ(q2 + q3))q1 +( α2 − βq2 − γ(q1 + q3))q2 (14.A)
while ﬁrm 3 chooses q3 that maximizes
π3 =( α3 − βq3 − γ(q1 + q2))q3 (14.B)
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The result that follows is valid both for price and quantity competition.
When the value of the brand arising from merger is equal to the average of the values
of the pre-merger brands (α = α1+α2
2 ), the non-participating ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
concentration and merger of the rivals, and so are its customers.11 Firm 3 is better oﬀ if
ﬁrms 1 and 2 concentrate than if they merge if and only if α>α1+α2
2 ,t h es a m eb e i n gt r u e
for its clients.
Proposition 2 If merging rises the surviving brand value above the average of the pre-
acquisition values, the proﬁt of the outside ﬁrm and the surplus of its clients are higher if
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3am), so the same conclusions apply.
Rivalry thus implies a much narrower range of α where the regulatory authority has no
need to care about the joining ﬁrms’ decision, since outsiders have conﬂicting interests with




The "surviving" interval where there is coincidence of preferences for all agents is only
α1+α2
2 <α<α1+α2
2 +m i n {∆PS
2 ,∆CS
2 }.T h e v a l u e s o f ∆PS
2 and ∆CS
2 now vary with the
type of rivalry: there is an expression for price competition and a diﬀerent one for quantity
competition (whose magnitudes are hardly comparable).
Lemma 3 If merging rises the surviving brand value (α) above the average of the pre-
acquisition values (α1 and α2)a n dﬁrms still prefer to concentrate, the regulatory authority
11Participating ﬁrms, as well as their clients, prefer concentration, which is in accordance with the results
obtained in section 3.
13only needs to intervene if customers of the joining parties are severely harmed by the agree-
ment, since every other agent (outsiders and their clients, as well as participants) beneﬁts.
Formally this situation occurs for α1+α2
2 <α<α1+α2
2 +∆PS
2 , where the upper bound denotes
the value of α above which ﬁrms decide to merge, and which depends on the strategic vari-
able chosen. In the interval α1+α2
2 <α<α1+α2
2 +m i n {∆PS
2 ,∆CS
2 } there is surely no need
for policy intervention; however, for every other α, that is, for most of the cases, including
every merging situation, there may be room for the authority to intervene, directing ﬁrms to
the socially optimal type of agreement.
4.3 Does the type of rivalry matter?
As we have just seen, the choice of the strategic variable - price or quantity - inﬂuences the
magnitude of the interval for α in which every agent’s interests are in accordance. However,
the type of rivalry matters also for the diﬀerence between concentration and merger whenever
α 6= α1+α2
2 , that is, for the relevance of intervention when this is advisable. Hence, it must be
taken into account by the regulatory authority when considering the consequences of a non-
intervention. Actually, one type of competition or the other may induce higher diﬀerences
between concentration and merger for participating ﬁrms, outsiders and clients, therefore
changing joining incentives and their consequences. This is clear from the expression below,
































































Hence, the strategic variable is relevant for the authority when considering the compared
eﬀects of the two possible types of agreement and deciding when its intervention, if to take
place, is more needed. The analysis of the above expressions allows the following conclusions.
Proposition 4 The type of strategic rivalry matters for the relevance of policy intervention,
if this is to occur (which also depends on the strategic variable chosen). When the value
of the brand deriving from merger is higher (lower) than the average of the values of the
two brands before acquisition, the higher the brand value of the ﬁrm that stays out of the
operation and the lower the brand values of those participating, the more likely that price
14competition induces a larger (smaller) diﬀerence between concentration and merger than
quantity competition in terms of proﬁts and consumer surplus, for participants, outsiders
and respective customers, thus making the authority’s intervention more (less) important.
Proof. Directly from computing the expressions above and taking derivatives.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Firm acquisition may give rise to a single brand name, or joining parties may decide to keep
both names in the market. This choice is based on the level of diﬀerentiation: own and
cross price eﬀects and brand values. The paper has also shown that the two possibilities
for the acquirer are not indiﬀerent in terms of their eﬀects upon proﬁts (of participants
and rivals) and consumers’ surpluses, thus stressing the opportunity for policy intervention.
Depending on the value of the new common brand (and on the strategic variable chosen),
there may actually exist some divergence between the various agents’ interests. When policy
intervention is advisable, the type of rivalry (price or quantity) makes it more or less needed.
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